

THE SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

Joseph Jeffrey Howard, Department of State
B.A., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2011-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 10-06-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2010 – JUN 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Security Strategy of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Joseph Jeffrey Howard				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the law enforcement and security organization of the U.S. Department of State. As such, it is responsible for many law enforcement and security related issues within the Department of State. One of these issues is to provide security to American embassies, consulates, their staffs, and other designated American interests overseas. This thesis examines the strategy used by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to provide security for American civilian interests overseas and whether this strategy remains relevant in the current threat environment. The examination was divided into three areas: (1) the current operational environment; (2) current DS operations; and (3) trends influencing future DS security operations. The current operational environment revealed a continuing threat to American civilian interests overseas. The review of current DS operations illustrated an organization attempting to address the current threats, but involved in a seemingly never ending threat, counter-threat escalation with those that wish to do harm to American civilian interests overseas. Finally, the review of future trends revealed DS will continue to expand its role as the Department of State becomes involved in more non-permissive environments and humanitarian crises.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Diplomatic Security, Department of State, Terrorism, Embassy Security, Law Enforcement, Counter-Terrorism					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 77	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Joseph Jeffrey Howard

Thesis Title: The Security Strategy of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Jonathan M. Williams, M.A.

_____, Member
John A. Dyson, MBA

_____, Member
Gregory Scott Hospodor, Ph.D

Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Government, the U.S. Department of State and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, by Joseph Jeffrey Howard, 77 pages.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the law enforcement and security organization of the U.S. Department of State. As such, it is responsible for many law enforcement and security related issues within the Department of State. One of these issues is to provide security to American embassies, consulates, their staffs, and other designated American interests overseas. This thesis examined the strategy used by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to provide security for American civilian interests overseas and whether this strategy remains relevant in the current threat environment. The examination was divided into three areas: (1) the current operational environment; (2) current DS operations; and (3) trends influencing future DS security operations. The current operational environment revealed a continuing threat to American civilian interests overseas. The review of current DS operations illustrated an organization attempting to address the current threats, but involved in a seemingly never ending threat, counter-threat escalation with those that wish to do harm to American civilian interests overseas. Finally, the review of future trends revealed DS will continue to expand its role as the Department of State becomes involved in more non-permissive environments and humanitarian crises.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I sincerely thank my thesis committee—Mr. Williams, Dr. Hospodor, and Mr. Dyson—for their tremendous guidance, assistance, and advice.

Thank you to COL Raymond for his guidance, assistance, and advice during my thesis seminar group.

Thank you to Ms. Chapman for her editing support of this thesis.

I also wish to thank the staff of Fort Leavenworth's Combined Arms Research Library for their research assistance.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife Abigail and son Elias for their patience and understanding during this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
ACRONYMS	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
TABLES	xi
CHAPTER 1	1
Consulate Peshawar	1
Diplomatic Security Mission	3
Limitations	5
Thesis	6
Definitions	6
Significance of the Study	7
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	8
U.S. Government Information	8
Private Sector Information	14
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	15
Research Method	15
Objectivity	17
Oral History Materials	17
Summary	18
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	19
Chapter Organization	19
Current Operational Environment	19
DS Security Operations	27
Embassy Security Program	28
National Level Security Program	34

Future Influential Trends	42
Conclusion	44
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	46
Conclusion	46
Recommendations.....	46
Recommendations for Further Study	53
APPENDIX A POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS - 2009.....	55
APPENDIX B POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS - 2008.....	59
REFERENCE LIST	63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	66

ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ASOS	Advance Security Overseas Seminar
ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance Program
BRSO	Regional Security Officer Course
BSAC	Basic Special Agent Course
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
FACT	Foreign Affairs Counter Threat
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HTTC	High Threat Training Course
ILE	U.S. Army Intermediate Level Education
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
ITA	Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
JOPP	Joint Operations Planning Process
LEWG	Law Enforcement Working Group
MSD	Office of Mobile Security Deployments
OSAC	Overseas Security Advisory Council
OSPB	Overseas Security Policy Board
QDDR	Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
RFJ	Rewards for Justice Program
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade

RSO	Regional Security Officer
SAFE	Serving Abroad for Families and Employees
SETL	Security Environment Threat List
SOS	Security Overseas Seminar
TDY	Temporary Duty Assignment
TeTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
TTP	Tactics, Training, and Procedures
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Damage to Checkpoint, Consulate Peshawar	2
Figure 2. DS Special Agents Inspecting Damage from a Rocket Attack, American Embassy Baghdad, January 25, 2007	23
Figure 3. Post-Earthquake Rescue in Leogane, Haiti on January 15, 2010	26
Figure 4. Generic Regional Security Office Organizational Chart	29
Figure 5. Embassy Security Features	30
Figure 6. American Embassy Copenhagen personnel conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive (CBRNE) training with Danish Police, Fire Department, and Emergency Management Agency.....	32
Figure 7. South African Police Conducting ATA Led CBRNE Training.....	36
Figure 8. DS Special Agent Stands Guard During Secretary of State Rice Visit to the Palestinian Territories	39
Figure 9. Example of an RFJ Poster.....	41

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Political Violence Against Americans, 2009	20
Table 2. Political Violence Against Americans, 2008	21
Table 3. Political Violence Against Americans in Non-Permissive Environments, 2008-2009	24

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Consulate Peshawar

On April 5, 2010, members of the Terek-e-Taliban Pakistani (TeTP), an umbrella group of Taliban in Pakistan (Bajoria 2010), conducted a complex attack on the American Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan. Peshawar is the capital of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and lies near Pakistan's Federally Administrative Tribal Area, which is an area known for providing support to the Taliban. Peshawar is also a key logistics point for moving American and NATO supplies from Pakistani ports through the Khyber Pass and into Afghanistan (Global Security.org 2010).

The attack consisted of two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), suicide bombers, and individuals armed with AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) (Asad 2010). It began with the detonation of one VBIED at the consulate's outer perimeter security checkpoint, followed by an attempt by the TeTP force to breach the checkpoint. As a result of bad luck and poor preparation, the TeTP force did not breach the perimeter security.

Following their setback, the TeTP force proceeded to use AK-47s and RPGs to fire on the consulate compound and surrounding Pakistani government buildings. Approximately eight minutes after the initial explosion, Pakistani security forces reinforcements arrived on the scene. Consulate security personnel were at their alert stations, but did not participate in the fight between the TeTP and Pakistani security forces. The explosion and subsequent firefight between Pakistani security forces and the

TeTP force resulted in the deaths of three Pakistani security forces and at least six of the attackers (Asad 2010).

The following photograph, figure 1, shows some of the damage at the checkpoint. A Diplomatic Security Special Agent wearing a protective plate carrier can be seen in the background.




Figure 1. Damage to Checkpoint, Consulate Peshawar

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Overseas Security Advisory Council, *U.S. Consulate Peshawar Attack, April 5, 2010* (Rosslyn, VA: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2010), 3.

The April 2010 attack is only the most recent attack against the consulate. There were two mortar attacks against the consulate in 2007 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009, 54). In addition, the Consul General, the principal American diplomat

stationed at a consulate, for Consulate Peshawar was attacked on August 27, 2008, when her motorcade came under fire by unknown assailants as it travelled between her residence and the consulate (Shah 2008). No one was injured in this attack.

Diplomatic Security Mission

The April 5th attack against Consulate Peshawar is one example of the numerous terrorist attacks against American diplomatic facilities and personnel in recent years. According to the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security's 2009 Annual Report on Political Violence Against Americans, there were 79 incidents of anti-American terrorism or political violence worldwide (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis 2009, 3). This number excludes attacks against the American military and Department of State in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has the mission of defending American diplomatic facilities and personnel against terrorism or political violence. DS is the law enforcement and security branch of the Department of State. The primary mission of DS, as stated in the 2009 Diplomatic Security Year in Review is:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), the law enforcement and security arm of the U.S. Department of State, provides a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy. To advance American interests and foreign policy, DS protects people, property, and information at more than 285 State Department missions worldwide. DS is the most widely represented U.S. security and law enforcement organization in the world, and a leader in international investigations, threat analysis, cyber security, counterterrorism, and security technology. (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Public Affairs 2010)

The strategy developed by DS for conducting its mission consists of securing American embassies abroad and foreign embassies in the United States; providing security to visiting dignitaries and diplomats to the United States and to American dignitaries and

diplomats when they travel abroad; conducting criminal investigations concerning passport and visa fraud; representing Department of State on many domestic criminal and counterterrorism investigation task forces; providing unclassified threat information to the American private and business sectors; and providing security training to America's allies.

Usually, this security strategy is conducted in a relatively permissive environment, either in a friendly nation, or at least in a nation that abides by international law and customs and has control within its borders. Post 9/11, the environment changed. There are new American embassies operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the embassies and consulates in Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan. All of these embassies would be closed, or at minimal staffing, based on the pre-9/11 criteria for closing/reducing an embassy due to security/safety threats. DS must now provide security to the American diplomatic community in these non-permissive environments.

In addition, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice initiated a new policy called "Transformational Diplomacy" in 2006. In her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 14, 2006, former Secretary Rice described Transformational Diplomacy as an initiative "to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system" (Nakamura 2007, 5). Transformational Diplomacy also included moving people and positions from Washington, D.C. and Western Europe to "strategic" countries, such as Afghanistan, Brazil, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan, and Yemen. This initiative

added additional security requirements to DS by adding more staff to non-permissive and high threat countries.

As one of the several civilian U.S. government agencies conducting stability operations alongside the military in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of State requires DS to provide security to its personnel conducting these operations. Providing security may become even more problematic as the American military withdraws from Iraq and may draw down in Afghanistan over the next few years. Today's global security environment of persistent conflict and growing instability calls into question whether the current DS security strategy is effective in the existing threat environment.

Limitations

This thesis will not discuss the merits of using contractors or the validity of conducting diplomacy in combat zones. Exact details of physical, procedural, or technical security standards will not be discussed. These standards will only be discussed in a broad, general manner. DS tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs) will also only be discussed in generalities.

Further, the Fiscal Year 2012 Bureau of Diplomatic Security Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan will not be referenced as this document is most likely out of date. The Department of State *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)* was subsequent to the the Strategic Resource Plan, therefore, the Strategic Resource Plan must be modified to support the *QDDR*. However, it does not appear to have been modified since the publishing of the *QDDR*.

Thesis

This thesis will explore the security strategy used by DS to secure American diplomatic facilities and personnel and provide an evaluation of the strategy in light of the current threat toward American diplomatic facilities and personnel and the new environment in which American diplomacy is conducted. This evaluation explores three major areas: (1) the current operational environment, (2) current DS operations, and (3) trends influencing future DS security operations.

Definitions

Before proceeding further, there are several terms and phrases used within the DS community that require clarification. First is the term “DS security strategy.” This term is used describe the methods used by DS to conduct its mission of providing a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy. As mentioned previously, this strategy includes law enforcement activities, embassy security measures, personnel security missions, para-military activities, and training programs.

A second frequently used term is “non-permissive environment.” In regards to this study, the term non-permissive environment means a country in which American diplomatic personnel receive a danger pay allowance of at least 25 percent and it is either an employee only post, also referred to as an unaccompanied post, or an employee and adult dependents only. Adult dependents are those aged 21 years and older. Countries currently meeting this criteria are Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan, and Yemen. In recent years, Algeria and Kosovo also met this criteria.

Another term used in this study is “complex attack.” This term is used within the military and law enforcement community to mean a coordinated attack involving

multiple weapons systems and usually involves at least simple military tactics. An example of a complex attack is the previously mentioned April 5, 2010 attack on Consulate Peshawar. As discussed, the TeTP used various weapons systems and basic military tactics in their attempt to breach the perimeter security of the consulate.

Significance of the Study

The administrations of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama recognize the need for increased operations by the Department of State. This increased Department of State activity will primarily occur in non-permissive environments or other high threat countries. This in turn will require DS to conduct security operations in these non-permissive areas. Prior to 9/11, DS was staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations primarily in permissive environments, with only limited, short term capabilities in non-permissive environments. Since 9/11, DS has modified its organization and training, increased staffing, and modernized equipment to conduct sustained operations in non-permissive environments. By evaluating the DS security strategy, this thesis will offer guidance on how DS can further modify its strategy to meet the future demands placed upon it and allow the organization to continue to protect Department of State personnel and facilities worldwide.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis will explore the security strategy used by DS to secure American diplomatic facilities and personnel, and provide an evaluation of the strategy in light of the current threat toward American diplomatic facilities and personnel, and the new environment in which American diplomacy is conducted. This evaluation explores three major areas: (1) the current operational environment, (2) current DS operations, and (3) trends influencing future DS security operations.

Only unclassified material was used to conduct research on this thesis. Literature is organized into two categories: U.S. government information and private sector information.

U.S. Government Information

Department of State and DS published materials, manuals, handbooks, and reports are the basis for information on DS, the DS security strategy, and the DS training program. U.S. military regulations, manuals and reports were reviewed for comparison as needed. Specific information on security measures and standards is classified. However, there appears to be enough unclassified information to give a general idea of physical security standards and to provide information on the basic security tactics used by DS.

A series of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on DS are of great interest. One GAO report from November 2009, “Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review,” is of particular note as it directly addressed how DS is or is not evolving to meet its growing role. An example from this 2009 report concerns the

previously mentioned Consulate Peshawar. According to the GAO report, a Department of State official told the investigators that Consulate Peshawar would have been evacuated in 2006 had it not been for the Department of State's "Transformational Diplomacy" initiative (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009, 26).

The November 2009 report included many charts, graphs, and statistics highlighting the growth of DS since 1998. An example of this growth is the number of DS special agents. In 1998, there were approximately 750 DS special agents. As of 2009, this number had grown to approximately 1700 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009, 19-20). Although DS has increased its personnel numbers, the GAO found that the DS growth has been more reactive than strategic. Further, the Department of State strategic plan does not specifically address DS resource needs or management challenges. In addition, the GAO report states that several senior DS officials noted that DS remains reactive in nature based in part on DS having to react to Department of State requirements (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009, 36).

Unfortunately, the November 2009 GAO report does not address the actual security strategy employed by DS. The report's recommendations focused almost exclusively on the management of DS. The managerial recommendations are:

1. Operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff.
2. Staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language skills.
3. Operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade level.

The two recommendations with some relation to the DS security strategy are:

1. Providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards

2. Balancing security needs with Department of State's need to conduct its diplomatic mission

However, no specifics were given on how DS was to enact the two security related recommendations.

A second GAO report, "State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies," dated May 2005 focused primarily with security issues related to "soft" targets. Soft targets are schools, residences, places of worship, frequented entertainment centers or hotels associated with the American diplomatic communities. The focus of the May 2005 report was the need for the Department of State and DS to extend security protection to these soft targets and to provide additional security training for diplomats and other embassy staff. The impetus for this GAO report were terrorist attacks such as the Beslan school massacre in September 2004 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The GAO was also concerned that as embassies become better defended or "hard" targets, terrorists will look for other means of attacking Americans, focusing on "soft" targets.

The recommendations from this report are:

1. Include in the development of a comprehensive soft target strategy information that:
 - a. Determines the extent of Department of State's responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.
 - b. Addresses the legal and financial ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the private sector.
 - c. Develops programs and activities with Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which Department of State is deemed responsible.

- d. Integrates into the embassy emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program.
2. Mandate counterterrorism training.
3. Fully implement the personal security accountability system.

As mentioned in the department rebuttal to this GAO report, DS had programs in place to address the recommendations, and in the intervening years since this report, has strengthened these programs. DS and the Regional Security Officers (RSOs), DS special agents assigned as the heads of security for embassies, have several security programs that address these recommendations.

First, RSOs may request funding to assist schools attended by American embassy personnels' children with security upgrades. Typically, this funding is used for the construction of walls or fences, installation of security cameras and exterior lighting, and the installation of shatter resistant window film. The funding is given to the school as a grant, which is monitored by the RSO and embassy. RSOs are also encouraged to provide non-binding guidance to any schools attended by American students.

RSOs are also responsible for a residential security program. Depending on the level of terrorist and other threats in the country, this program can include installation of residential locks and security alarms, installation of security doors and windows, or deployment of stationary guards and mobile guard patrols. Further, based on threat level and information, there may also be security details, to include armored vehicles, assigned to embassy personnel.

Another example of DS addressing these recommendations is the expansion of the membership for the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). The OSAC is a federal

advisory committee with a U.S. government charter to promote security cooperation between American business and private sector interests worldwide and the U.S. Department of State (Overseas Security Advisory Council 2010). Initially, the OSAC was focused on threats to the American business community. However, the OSAC constituency has expanded to American not for profit organizations, American educational institutions, and in some cases, foreign businesses with substantial American interests (Overseas Security Advisory Council 2010). By expanding the constituency of the OSAC, DS is able to pass threat information and security recommendations to a broader, non-U.S. government audience.

Another category of U.S. government information is the many reports on the current tactics used by terrorist, insurgent, and para-military groups confronting the U.S. and its allies. These reports include the unclassified OSAC after action reports (AARs) of various terrorist attacks. As the most reliable, unclassified official U.S. government reports on terrorist attacks, I chose to reference these OSAC reports throughout this thesis when discussing terrorist attacks.

A different set of reports are the “Occasional Papers” written by various authors from the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute. An example from the Occasional Papers is “We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War,” written by Matt M. Matthews, a member of the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In his report, Matthews discusses the lack of Israeli preparedness for conventional military operations and Hezbollah’s transformation from a terrorist organization to a para-military organization capable of fighting a conventional conflict against a modern military (Matthews 2007, 61-65). The importance of this report for this thesis is to show how

terrorist organizations have transformed to combat their enemies. For DS, this means terrorist groups are capable of using sophisticated military tactics and modern weapons. DS can no longer focus on only ill equipped and trained groups conducting amateur attacks against its charges, but must take into consideration the improving skills and equipment of potential adversaries.

Two other U.S. government documents reviewed for this thesis were the Department of State 2010 *QDDR* and the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 *Bureau of Diplomatic Security Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan*. The 2010 *QDDR* is the first Department of State quadrennial review. It is modelled in some aspects to the Department of Defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review*. The *QDDR* is divided into multiple chapters, which set the context for the *QDDR* and provide guidance on the issues facing the Department of State. The most important chapter in regards to this thesis is Chapter 1, "Global Trends and Guiding Policy Principles." This chapter provides the context for future Department of State operations, allowing DS to plan to support these operations. The second document, the FY 2012 *Bureau of Diplomatic Security Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan* was of less use to this thesis as it was published several months before the previously mentioned *QDDR*. Therefore, while reviewed, it will not be included in this thesis as was mentioned in the limitations section of chapter 1.

There are many other types of U.S. government information that was reviewed for this thesis, including U.S. military regulations and Department of State regulations. U.S. military information on personnel security details and physical security operations were reviewed for how the U.S. military conducts these operations. Department of State

regulations were reviewed for information on the Department of State's guidance for DS security operations.

Private Sector Information

Two books were reviewed which provide a narrative on attacks against American embassies. The first book, "Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001," was written by Steve Coll, an American Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, author and current president and CEO of the New America Foundation (New America Foundation 2010). One of the chapters in Mr. Coll's book recounts the 1979 storming and burning of the American Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The second book, "Guests of the Ayatollah," written by Mark Bowden, an American journalist, author, and current contributing editor for Vanity Fair magazine (Vanity Fair 2010), provides a detailed narrative of the 1979 Iranian Hostage incident. Both books provide detailed information on some of the first attacks on American embassies by groups associated with fundamentalist Islam. They also provide background information as to why physical security of embassies is vital to America.

The next chapter explains the methodology used in this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Method

By design, this thesis is a qualitative study using a “case study” approach. This approach allows for an indepth study of a defined program for a given period of time. In the case of this thesis, the DS security strategy is being studied within the post 9-11 and near future time periods in order to ascertain its effectiveness against current and perceived future threats. During the course of this case study, the DS security strategy was investigated in order to provide information aimed at answering the primary research question, “Is the DS security strategy valid against current and perceived future threats?”

In order to conduct this study, information was gathered via a review of literature concerning this topic, observations were made of DS security activities, and audiovisual materials relating to DS security activities were reviewed. This information was placed into context by collecting data on the political, social, and economic environment in which DS operates. This contextual data allows for a better understanding of how and why DS selected particular tactics and operations to be a part its security strategy.

The data from this case study is examined in chapter four. This analysis chapter is divided into three sections: the current operational environment, current DS security operations, and factors influencing future DS operations. The intent of this organization is to categorize the data into groups that provide a logical grouping and ease of analysis. Specific documents, observations, and audiovisual materials were examined for data relevant to this study. This examination revealed data, themes, and patterns which will be analyzed in chapter four. Upon completion of the analysis, an overall concept of the DS

security strategy and operational environment was made, along with recommendations to improve the DS security strategy.

The first section of the analysis chapter deals with factors shaping the DS operational environment. These factors are categorized into three sub-sections which are: (1) the continued threat from terrorism; (2) Department of State and other U.S. government civilian agencies activities in non-permissive environments; and (3) the seeming increase of world instability. By exploring and interpreting data from literature, observations, and audiovisual materials, a narrative was created for each category in order to describe and explain how these factors influence the DS operational environment. This information was also analyzed for any emergent methods being used by terrorists to bypass the DS security strategy.

Also included in the first section is data concerning terrorist attacks involving U.S. civilian targets overseas. This data was analyzed for patterns indicating particular types of attacks, trends in the attacks, location of the attacks, and casualties created by the attacks. The analysis of this data is displayed in several tables in the first section. It is further explained in a subsequent narrative portion.

The second section of the analysis focuses on current DS security operations. This section is further categorized into two sub-sections, embassy specific security programs and national security programs. Data from literature, observations, and audiovisual materials was collected and interpreted in order to describe and explain how DS security operations are designed and function in the current threat environment. As part of this section, diagrams and photographs are used to explain security organizations and concepts.

The final section focuses on factors influencing future DS operations. These factors are summarized into five categories as outlined in the 2010 Department of State *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*: new global threats, new geopolitical and geo-economics landscape, diffusion of power to a wide range of non-state actors, growing costs of conflict and state weakness, and the information age acceleration of international affairs and facilitation of a new era of connectivity (U.S. Department of State 2010). A narrative based on data collected from literature and observations was created to explain how these factors will influence future DS operations.

The final chapter of this thesis consists of recommendations that may assist DS in future operations. These recommendations are based on the analysis conducted in chapter four. Each recommendation addresses particular deficiencies noted in the reviewed materials or discovered via analysis.

Objectivity

While the author is a DS special agent, every effort was made to maintain impartiality. To ensure this unbiased approach, literature from non-DS sources was sought to ensure balance. An example of non-DS information is the GAO reports on DS. Multiple sources of data were collected, to include literature, observations, and audiovisual materials. These multiple sources of data were used to help ensure there was minimal bias.

Oral History Materials

Interviews were not conducted for this thesis.

Summary

A case study was chosen as the research method for this thesis. This method was chosen as it allowed for an in depth study of a defined program for a given period of time. During the course of this thesis, the DS security strategy was investigated in order to provide information in order to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter Organization

The analysis for this thesis was organized into three sections: the current operational environment, DS security operations, and trends influencing future DS security operations. Each section was further organized into subdivisions in order to ease analysis and enhance understanding. The analysis within each section consists of tables, diagrams, photographs, and a narrative. Multiple methods of analysis were chosen based on their effectiveness in presenting an idea. The first area discussed is the current operational environment.

Current Operational Environment

DS operates in a complex security environment. The complexity of the security environment can be attributed to three primary factors. First, there remains a significant worldwide threat of anti-U.S violence and terrorism, see tables 1 and 2. The data used in these tables was gathered from the 2008 and 2009 editions of the DS published “Political Violence Against Americans.” These reports focus on major politically motivated incidents against the U.S. or representatives of the U.S. In addition to their political nature, DS chose the events in these reports based on specific criteria: the presence of casualties, substantial property damage, the use of unusual tactics and weapons, and perception of the targets as intentionally those of the U.S. or representatives of U.S. interests. These reports do not include the many peaceful demonstrations, minor criminal

activities, and other minimally dangerous incidents that occur at U.S. embassies, consulates, and overseas residential areas on a daily basis.

Incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan are limited to those involving targets which are assigned to the embassy, more commonly referred to as being under U.S. Chief of Mission authority. Further, indirect fire (rockets and mortars) attacks against diplomatic facilities were only included in the numbers when those attacks resulted in casualties or significant property damage. Therefore, the actual number of attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan was underreported.

Table 1. Political Violence Against Americans, 2009

2009	Western Hemisphere	Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Near East	South and Central Asia	East Asia and Pacific	U.S.	Total per Category
Assassination			1					1
Assault						1		1
Attempted Bombing	1	1					1	3
Attempted Car Bomb		1						1
Attempted Grenade	1							1
Bombing	3	2		3		2		10
Fake Bomb	1							1
Grenade				1				1
Harassment		1	1					2
Indirect Fire				41				41
Kidnapping			1		1			2
Small Arms Fire					1			1
Stabbing				1				1
Traffing				3		3		6
Suicide Car			2	1	1			4
Violent Demonstration	6	8						14
Total per Region	12	13	5	50	3	6	1	90

Source: Created by author, data adapted from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis, *2009 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 7-44.

Table 2. Political Violence Against Americans, 2008

2008	Western Hemisphere	Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Near East	South and Central Asia	East Asia and Pacific	U.S.	Total per Category
Ambush					1			1
Armed Attack		1						1
Assassination			1		1			2
Assault				1	4			5
Attempted Bombing				1				1
Bombing		1	1	5	4			11
Extortion	1							1
Fire Bomb						1		1
Harassment			1					1
Hostage Rescue or Release	1		1					2
Indirect Fire				6				6
Kidnapping			1	1	1			3
Straffing	1			1				2
Violent Demonstration	2	4		1				7
Total per Region	5	6	5	16	11	1	0	42

Source: Created by author, data adapted from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis, *2008 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 3-45.

In the 2009 incidents, 41 people were killed of whom 22 were American. An additional 124 people were injured, 21 being American. In 2008, 268 people were killed of whom 22 were American. An additional 670 were injured, with 48 of those being American.

While it is not possible to identify the perpetrators of each incident, they appear to vary from criminal organizations to terrorist groups. In most cases, it appears Americans were the intentional target. Appendices A and B contain a detailed listing of the incidents. Further details on the specifics of each attack are available in the referenced source documents.

Also of note in the reports are the varied methods of attack, which include vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), rocket attacks, complex attacks upon fortified structures, and assassinations. While some of this variation is attributable to the many different groups responsible for the attacks or to a regional preference, some of the variations were in response to defensive measures emplaced by DS. An example of this are the attacks directed against Embassy Baghdad. Embassy Baghdad is located in the higher security area of Baghdad known as the International Zone, or Green Zone. There are multiple police and military check points, plus the embassy has the latest physical security technology. It would be extremely difficult for attackers to drive a VBIED near enough to the embassy to cause significant damage or for an assault against the embassy to be effective. Therefore, the prime means of attack against Embassy Baghdad was indirect fire, which bypassed the traditional physical security methods used by DS.



Figure 2. DS Special Agents Inspecting Damage from a Rocket Attack, American Embassy Baghdad, January 25, 2007

Source: Author's collection.

These indirect fire attacks also highlight the second factor influencing DS security operations, the increased security operations of the Department of State and other civilian U.S. government agencies in non-permissive environments. Over half of the attacks in 2008 and 2009 occurred in countries considered to be non-permissive. In 2008, 27 of 42 attacks occurred in non-permissive countries. In 2009, 52 of the 90 attacks occurred in non-permissive countries. table 3 further clarifies this point.

Table 3. Political Violence Against Americans in Non-Permissive Environments, 2008-2009

	2008	2009
Afghanistan	5	2
Iraq	9	48
Lebanon	2	0
Pakistan	5	1
Sudan	1	0
Yemen	5	1
	27	52

Source: Created by author, data adapted from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis, *2009 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 7-44; Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis, *2008 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 3-45.

As shown, DS operates in combat zones and countries which are extremely unstable and dangerous. Additionally, the attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq may increase when the U.S. military fully withdraws and the Department of State becomes the lead U.S. agency. Further, DS will likely operate in even more non-permissive environments as political and financial instability continues to increase throughout the world.

The final factor influencing the operational environment is increased world instability. The ongoing drug war in Mexico, food price demonstrations in Bolivia, and political riots throughout the Middle East are just three examples of this increased instability. Not only does this instability create an increased threat environment, but the instability weakens the ability of the host country to protect American interests as host

nations' security assets are either pre-occupied with other security incidents, or the security assets are compromised by the instability. The fewer reliable host country security assets, the more security DS must provide.

An example of host country being unable to fully support DS security operations was during the 2009 UN Conference of Parties 15 (COP-15) Climate Change conference in Copenhagen. An estimated 35,000 protestors and thousands of government officials from many nations travelled to Copenhagen for this conference. Included in this number was a large U.S. delegation, led by President Obama. The U.S. delegation also included the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Interior; 21 members of Congress; three governors to include Governor Schwarzenegger, and two mayors, Mayor Bloomberg of New York City and Mayor Villaraigosa of Los Angeles. To provide security for this event, the Danes were only able to muster 7,000 policemen. As a result of the Danes being overextended and unable to fully support the U.S. security needs, DS deployed an additional seven agents to support the two assigned to Regional Security Office Copenhagen (Dambroski 2010, 1-2).

Another result of the increased instability is the inability for some nations to provide for themselves during natural disasters. Along with the Department of Defense, the Department of State deploys in an effort to provide relief and to mitigate some effects of natural disasters. These relief deployments require additional DS security support. When a massive earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, DS deployed dozens of special agents and support staff to assist with embassy security, relief efforts, and search and rescue efforts (Casey 2010, 1-26).



Figure 3. Post-Earthquake Rescue in Leogane, Haiti on January 15, 2010
Source: U.S. Department of State, DS Photo Gallery, <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/c35692.htm> (accessed February 19, 2011). Photo courtesy of Dale Stroud, Mission FieldImages.com.

As explained in this section, there are three factors influencing the operational environment for DS: the continued significant threat of anti-U.S. violence and terrorism, the increased security operations of the Department of State and other civilian U.S. government agencies in non-permissive environments, and increased world instability. These factors create a complex security environment. The terrorist threats are tangible events that may be countered by physical security measures or other concrete means. In order to operate in non-permissive environments, DS has adopted tactics and methods associated with the U.S. military. To be successful in an increasingly unstable world, DS amplified its own internal capabilities, as well as increased training to allied nations' security forces. This multifaceted security strategy is explored further in the next section of this chapter.

DS Security Operations

For ease of discussion and analysis, the DS security operations were divided into two broad categories. The first category included security operations dealing directly with the security of embassies and their employees and families. The second category deals with security operations targeting a wider audience and managed from DS headquarters. This category is referred to as national level security programs. Both categories had security operations of various types that focused on specific areas of the threats described in the previous section.

The DS security operations are based on the security standards outlined in the 12 series of Department of State Foreign Affairs Manuals (FAMs) and Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAHs) and from the directives of the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB). The OSPB reports to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The OSPB is chaired by the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and its membership consists of representatives from the Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of Treasury, Agency for International Development, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (joined with Department of State in 1998), Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, United States Information Agency (joined with Department of State in 1998), the Directorate of Central Intelligence's Center for Security Evaluation, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Foreign Agricultural Service, National Aeronautical and Space Administration, Peace Corps, and Office of Management and Budget. The OSPB will consider, develop, coordinate and promote policies, standards and agreements on

overseas security operations, programs and projects which affect all U.S. government agencies under the authority of a chief of mission abroad (U.S. President 1994). These two sources provide guidance to DS on all security related matters. Based on this guidance, DS has created a variety of security programs that meet these standards and adhere to recurring central themes from the standards: low risk assumption, low tolerance for casualties, maximum protection of life, concentric rings of defense, and force multiplication. However, DS security programs are inherently passive and reactive due to the above mentioned themes, the nature of defending a stationary diplomatic target, and the restrictions placed upon DS by host country governments. An example of a host country's restriction is the denial of permission for the Regional Security Office to use counter-surveillance teams. This issue was highlighted by the recent scandal in Norway in which the surveillance detection team's operations were suspended (Berglund 2010).

Embassy Security Program

The embassy security programs are divided into five categories: security of the embassy and staff, soft-targets program, security assistance to host nation, law-enforcement activities, and the OSAC. Central to all embassy security programs is the embassy security office, the Regional Security Office. Regional Security Offices are located in every embassy and some consulates. A DS special agent, referred to as a RSO, manages each Regional Security Office. The RSO serves as the senior law enforcement and security advisor to the ambassador. Additional staffing within a Regional Security Office depends on the size of the embassy or consulate, its threat level, and the associated workload. The typical organization of a Regional Security Office is shown in figure 4.

Larger embassies with a significant threat, such as Embassy Baghdad are staffed by nearly 100 DS special agents, along with hundreds of guards and support staff.




Figure 4. Generic Regional Security Office Organizational Chart
Source: Created by author.

The primary security program managed by the RSO is the security of the embassy or consulate, the staff, and their families. The first objective of this program is to secure the embassy or consulate. To mitigate threats, the RSO develops, implements, and manages a security program consisting of physical, cyber, procedural, and personnel security measures. These security measures form a concentric ring of security around the embassy or consulate, see figure 5.




Figure 5. Embassy Security Features

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Affairs and Trade, *Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 7.

Secondly, the RSO secures secondary sites, such as warehouses. The security requirements are less rigid for these secondary sites. For both primary and secondary site staff, the RSO institutes a security awareness and safety drill training program. This training varies from fire drills to surveillance detection training. The RSO also must secure the residences of all staff, in particular the Ambassador and other key leaders. The residential security program also consists of a combination of physical security measures and a training program.

The next security program is the soft-target program. This program was developed as a counter to terrorists targeting U.S. persons outside their work and homes. The program focuses on non-official U.S. facilities that are nevertheless associated with the official U.S. presences. This consists primarily of schools, churches, and other

morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. The RSO provides security guidance and suggestions to these entities. In the case of schools, DS will also fund limited security upgrades, such as shatter-resistant window film and security walls. An example of an attack on a soft target is the March 17, 2002 attack by terrorist on a Protestant Church in the diplomatic zone of Islamabad, Pakistan. Five people were killed, including two Americans (an American Embassy employee and her daughter). The attack wounded another 40 individuals (CNN 2002).

The third program consists of security assistance to host nation. This program consists primarily with training support to host nation security forces. There are two methods with which DS conducts training with the host nation. The first consists of locally established training exercises between the Regional Security Office and host nation. The second method, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) is more formal and controlled through DS headquarters. ATA is described in more detail in the next section. Other assistance provided to host nation security elements include intelligence sharing, equipment and financial assistance, and law enforcement support.



Figure 6. American Embassy Copenhagen personnel conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive (CBRNE) training with Danish Police, Fire Department, and Emergency Management Agency
Source: Regional Security Office, American Embassy Copenhagen.

DS special agents are sworn federal law enforcement officials. As such, they may investigate a range of criminal activity, primarily illegal passport or visa issuance or use (U.S. Congress 2010). The RSO is the Department of State's primary contact with host nation law enforcement and security organizations. The RSO works with the host nation to coordinate law enforcement investigations, training, and other associated activities. The RSO is also tasked with leading the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) within every embassy and some consulates. The LEWG consists of all U.S. law enforcement agencies and others as designated by the Ambassador. The purpose of the LEWG is to coordinate U.S. law enforcement activities within the host nation.

Represented by the special agents within the Regional Security Office, DS also assists in terrorism investigations. A successful DS and Pakistani terrorism investigation resulted in the 1995 arrest of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, when Pakistani security forces arrested Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan (Wright 2004, A21).

DS is also involved in terrorism investigation through the RSOs and the Department of Justice's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). JTTFs are partnerships between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials tasked with conducting terrorism investigations. DS is a member of more than twenty JTTFs throughout the U.S. As a member of these JTTFs, DS contributes its expertise on passport and visa investigations and extensive law enforcement connections worldwide.

The final security program managed by the RSO is the OSAC. OSAC is a joint public/private sector partnership to establish continuing liaison and to provide for operational security cooperation between the Department of State security functions and the private sector, to provide for regular and timely interchange of information between the private sector and the Department of State concerning developments in the overseas security environment security cooperation, to recommend methods and provide material for coordinating security planning and implementation of security programs coordinate security planning, and to recommend methods to protect the competitiveness of American businesses operating worldwide (Overseas Security Advisory Council 2011). There are currently over 140 OSAC Country Councils operating throughout the world. Each council is led by a partnership of the RSO and a member of the private sector. Membership is open to any OSAC constituent and members of foreign organizations, at the discretion of the RSO (Overseas Security Advisory Council 2011).

Through these five security programs, the RSO attempts to mitigate the threats facing American interests abroad. The programs are varied and range from the tangible physical security measures of an embassy, to more intangible aspects such as sharing threat information with American businesses. The programs adhere to the principles inherent within DS security operations: low risk assumption, low tolerance for casualties, maximum protection of life, concentric rings of defense, and force multiplication. DS also has security programs that are not controlled by RSOs. These security programs are focused on a broader audience and managed directly by DS headquarters

National Level Security Program

DS has many national level security programs. This section is not meant to be a comprehensive list of all these programs. It will only discuss four of the programs which are representative of the whole. The four programs are the previously mentioned ATA program, the Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA), Office of Mobile Security Deployments (MSD), and the Rewards for Justice Program.

The ATA program trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from foreign governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism. DS officers work with the host country's government and a team from that country's American Embassy to develop the most effective means of training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protections, and VIP protection (U.S. Department of State 2011a). This program is similar to the U.S. military's Foreign Internal Defense training program. A team within DS assesses the training needs of the host nation's security element and then develops the curriculum. DS provides the resources to conduct the training and provides the security element with the equipment

necessary to conduct the mission. The training takes place in the U.S., host country, or in a training area located in another nation. DS uses a variety of experts to conduct the training. These trainers come from other U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, police associations, and private security firms and consultants (U.S. Department of State 2011a).

Most ATA program recipients are developing nations lacking human and other resources needed to maintain an effective antiterrorism program and infrastructure (U.S. Department of State 2011a). Little to no training is provided to developed nations through this program. ATA training seeks to address deficiencies noted in the ability to perform the following areas: protecting national borders, protecting critical infrastructure, protecting national leadership, responding to and resolving terrorist incidents, and managing critical terrorist incidents having national-level implications (U.S. Department of State 2011a).



Figure 7. South African Police Conducting ATA Led CBRNE Training
Source: U.S. Diplomatic Mission to South Africa, Press Releases, www.southafrica.usembassy.gov/press100326.html (accessed February 20, 2011).

Since its inception in 1983, ATA has trained and assisted more than 100,000 foreign security and law enforcement officials from 160 countries (U.S. Department of State 2011a). These foreign security and law enforcement personnel have primary responsibility in their nations to take the offensive against international terrorist cells and networks that seek to target Americans overseas and at home. These officials also respond to and mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks that occur in their nations (U.S. Department of State 2011a).

ATA is an excellent example of the DS security strategy. ATA trains another country's security elements to conduct anti and counter-terrorism missions. This exemplifies the principles of force multiplication, low-risk to U.S. assets and information security operations, and low tolerance for loss of American lives.

ITA serves as the interface between DS and the U.S. intelligence community on all international and domestic terrorism matters. ITA has no collection assets and is a consumer of intelligence from other organizations. Its importance to DS is that it ensures DS intelligence requirements are understood and met. While this may seem redundant as the Department of State has another intelligence office, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), INR focuses on intelligence to support diplomatic and policy efforts, while ITA focuses on threat information. Also, other intelligence agencies may not be aware of DS requirements, understand those requirements, or have the ability or desire to meet those requirements. ITA conducts its own research, while monitoring and analyzing all source intelligence on terrorist activities and threats directed against Americans and U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel and facilities overseas. In addition, ITA monitors threats against the Secretary of State, senior U.S. officials, visiting foreign dignitaries, resident foreign diplomats, and foreign missions in the United States for whom DS has a security responsibility (U.S. Department of State 2011b).

Real-time threat assessments are provided to support operational and policy decision making by senior Department of State and DS officers. Threat notifications are issued to Americans and U.S. missions abroad as warranted. ITA works closely with the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs to inform the public of threats or

security-related issues through the Consular Information Program, whose more familiar products include Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts (U.S. Department of State 2011b).

ITA administers the Security Environment Threat List (SETL), which reflects four categories of security threat, including political violence and crime, at all U.S. missions overseas. Released semiannually, the SETL aids DS management in the allocation of overseas security resources and programs. The SETL also sets the base security standards that must be met. The RSO submits a detailed questionnaire to ITA, then ITA analyzes the questionnaire and assigns a threat level. ITA also conducts trend analyses and case studies of acts of terrorism, political violence, and crime that affect the security of Americans overseas. The office produces several publications, including Political Violence Against Americans. This annual publication is an authoritative narrative and statistical compendium of all acts of terrorism and political violence against U.S. interests in a given year (U.S. Department of State 2011b).

Upon request, consultations and briefings are provided to senior department officials, White House staff, congressional delegations, U.S. law enforcement agencies, other U.S. intelligence organizations, and friendly foreign law enforcement and intelligence organizations. In conjunction with OSAC, analysts also brief corporate security directors and CEOs, and American business audiences in the United States and throughout the world (U.S. Department of State 2011b). Through ITA, DS has its own intelligence analysis organization whose mission is to ensure DS intelligence requirements are met. Having its own dedicated intelligence analysis office allows DS to better fulfill its mission.

MSD serves as the DS quick reaction force to supplement embassies, consulates, or protective details that require additional security forces above those provided organically or by the host nation. MSD also provides specialized counterterrorism and personal security training to employees of embassies and consulates. MSD is staffed by DS special agents and technical specialists, such as medics (U.S. Department of State 2011c).

MSD teams deploy to embassies or consulates during periods of increased threat, crisis, or natural disaster. A limited number of teams are on standby in the U.S. and are able to deploy with less than 24 hours notice. Teams also augment the protective details of senior Department of State staff, or other designated individuals, when those individuals travel to high risk areas, such as Iraq or Afghanistan (U.S. Department of State 2011c).



Figure 8. DS Special Agent Stands Guard During Secretary of State Rice Visit to the Palestinian Territories

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Press Releases, <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/48707.htm> (accessed February 26, 2011). Photo Credit: AP/Wide World Photo.

Special agents assigned to MSD receive an additional six months of weapons, tactics, medical, and other skills necessary for countering hostile actions directed against individuals under the protection of the U.S. Government. Once the initial six months of training is complete, agents will continue their training when not deployed. The assignment to MSD is three years, with the ability to extend to a fourth year (U.S. Department of State 2011c).

MSD personnel may also train embassy and consulate staff on a variety of security topics, both on a scheduled and an emergency basis. Subjects taught include: personnel security, counterterrorism techniques, defensive driving, firearms usage, surveillance detection, rape awareness, and carjacking avoidance. Training in emergency medical care is also offered. Marine security guards and local guards are given specialized training to suit the demands of their often dangerous responsibilities (U.S. Department of State 2011c)

The final program to be discussed is the Rewards for Justice program. This program was established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism P.L. 98-533. The program is administered by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Under this program, the Secretary of State may offer rewards of up to \$5 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property worldwide. Rewards also may be paid for information leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorists attempting, committing, conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting in the commission of such acts. The USA Patriot Act of 2001, which became law on October 26, 2001, authorizes the Secretary to offer or pay rewards of greater than \$5 million if he determines that a greater amount is necessary to

combat terrorism or to defend the United States against terrorist acts. The Secretary of State has authorized a reward of up to \$25 million for information leading to the capture of Usama bin Laden and other key Al-Qaida leaders (U.S. Department of State 2011e).



Figure 9. Example of an RFJ Poster

Source: U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/badguys/061205/bad_guys_of_the_week_the_faces.htm (accessed February 26, 2011).

Since the program began, the United States has paid over \$60 million to more than 40 people who provided credible information that led to the arrest of terrorists or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide. The program played a significant role in the arrest of international terrorist Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. It was also instrumental in leading U.S. military forces in Iraq to the location of Uday and Qusay Hussein (U.S. Department of State 2011e).

DS security operations are based on two series of documents, the FAMs and FAHs of the Department of State and the directives of the OSPB. These two series have five common themes: low risk assumption, low tolerance for casualties, maximum protection of life, concentric rings of defense, and force multiplication. DS developed security programs that incorporate these five themes. The next section will discuss future factors influencing DS security operations.

Future Influential Trends

The recently published Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) lists five categories of trends that will reshape the global context of American foreign policy: new global threats, new geopolitical and geo-economics landscape, diffusion of power to a wide range of non-state actors, growing costs of conflict and state weakness, the information age acceleration of international affairs and facilitation a new era of connectivity (U.S. Department of State 2011d).

The trends concerning global threats are further divided into seven categories: terrorism and violent extremism; proliferation of nuclear materials, particularly to terrorist organizations; shocks and economic disruptions to the global economy; climate change; cyber security; transnational crime; and pandemics. The following paragraphs will focus on the impact of these trends on DS security operations.

The continued threat of terrorism, violent extremism, and nuclear proliferation, requires DS to maintain its counterterrorism strategy. While the DS mandate does not directly address nuclear proliferation, DS criminal, intelligence, and counterterrorism assets will need to assist those primarily responsible for counter-proliferation. Also, while

not specifically addressed, the proliferation of chemical, biological, and radiological threats dictate that DS continue its CBRNE response training program.

Continued economic disruptions, both domestic and foreign, impact not only the operational environment, but also the ability of host nations and the United States to protect American assets overseas. Potential budget decreases will limit the security resources by host nations and DS. This will cause both host nations and DS to be innovative in their security solutions, or be forced to accept more risk.

The Department of State and DS must also prepare for the potential increase of natural disasters that may result from changes to the climate. Whether in the form of humanitarian relief, or as rescuers, DS will support any Department of State missions related to this trend. The Department of State, along with DS, must focus on preparing American embassies and consulates to better withstand these possible disasters. Similarly, the Department of State and DS must also prepare embassies and consulates for humanitarian relief or evacuations resulting from pandemics.

DS has faced the threats related to cyber security for many years. The ongoing Wikileaks issue is an example of the threat posed by poor cyber security. Once again, DS will need to be innovative and adaptive in creating security measures to counter the increased cyber security threat, while also allowing for the increased need for the Department of State to use cyber tools to further its many missions.

The increase in transnational crime will create a need for DS to be further involved in law enforcement issues. An increase in criminal leads will further strain DS and Regional Security Office resources. DS must also ensure its personnel are trained to deal with these transnational crime issues.

The trends of a changing geopolitical and geo-economics landscape, diffusion of power to a wide range of non-state actors, and growing costs of conflict and state weakness are interrelated. These three trends will exacerbate threat trends, such as terrorism, transnational crime, cyber security, and economic disruptions. At the same time, the Department of State will attempt to counter these trends with a resulting increased operational tempo. The result for DS is an increasingly destabilized operational environment in which it will operate on an increased basis.

Finally, the increased pace of international relations and interconnectivity means DS must be nimble in its response to security needs, prepare its personnel to work with other U.S. government agencies and other nations' security forces, and have a robust public affairs team to deal with the inevitable public affairs issues. DS must react quickly and decisively, while ensuring those reactions have a satisfactory public affairs image.

DS faces many challenges in the future. Several destabilizing trends will force the Department of State and therefore DS to operate in an increasingly destabilized world. In addition, the Federal budget deficits may force DS to cut spending, eroding security and adding further challenges. The Department of State and DS must adapt to these trends, or be willing to accept an even higher risk.

Conclusion

DS operates in a complex security environment. Three factors influencing this operational environment are: the continued significant threat of anti-U.S. violence and terrorism, the increased security operations of the Department of State and other civilian U.S. government agencies in non-permissive environments, and increased world instability. To counter the threats from this complex environment, DS security operations

were designed based on two series of documents, the FAMs and FAHs of the Department of State and the directives of the OSPB. These two series have five common themes: low risk assumption, low tolerance for casualties, maximum protection of life, concentric rings of defense, and force multiplication. DS developed security programs that incorporate these five themes. While adequate for the current threats, the DS security strategy must adapt to the trends that will reshape the global context of American foreign policy: new global threats, new geopolitical and geo-economics landscape, diffusion of power to a wide range of non-state actors, growing costs of conflict and state weakness, and the information age acceleration of international affairs and facilitating a new era of connectivity.

The next chapter will provide recommendations to strengthen DS security operations. These recommendations are based on the analysis from this chapter. The recommendations are framed within a series of limitations influenced by the previously mentioned trends as outlined in the Department of State's *QDDR*.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

DS operates in a complex security environment. Three factors influencing this operational environment are: the continued significant threat of anti-U.S. violence and terrorism, the increased operations of the Department of State and other civilian U.S. government agencies in non-permissive environments, and increased world instability. To counter the threats from this complex environment, DS created a security strategy based on two series of documents, the FAMs and FAHs of the Department of State and the directives of the OSPB. These two series have five common themes: low risk assumption, low tolerance for casualties, maximum protection of life, concentric rings of defense, and force multiplication. DS developed security programs that incorporate these five themes. Based on the themes and other operational factors, DS security programs are inherently passive and reactive. While adequate in most situations, DS security operations must pro-actively adapt to the trends that will reshape the global context of American foreign policy: new global threats, new geopolitical and geo-economics landscape, diffusion of power to a wide range of non-state actors, growing costs of conflict and state weakness, the information age acceleration of international affairs, and the facilitation a new era of connectivity.

Recommendations

The recommendations are framed within a series of limitations influenced by the previously mentioned trends as outlined in the Department of State's QDDR. These

limitations are: limits to available funding; American and host nation political sensitivities; and positive or neutral public affairs image.

This thesis proposes five specific recommendations within the previously mentioned limitations. These recommendations are: (1) creation of a baseline staffing pattern for each Regional Security Office based on the embassy or consulate threat rating and the size of the embassy or consulate staff; (2) inclusion of DS special agents and others who are trained in the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) onto the proposed DS planning staff; (3) increase counterterrorism and threat recognition training provided to U.S. government employees assigned overseas; (4) adjustments to DS special agent training; and (5) increased emphasis on a more proactive and aggressive security posture at American embassies and consulates.

The first recommendation is for DS headquarters to create a baseline staffing pattern for each Regional Security Office based on the embassy or consulate's threat rating and size of the embassy or consulate staff. This baseline must include all positions within a Regional Security Office. Once this baseline is established, DS would conduct a series of inspections or surveys to ensure each Regional Security Office is properly staffed to the minimum of this baseline. Any positions above this baseline must be justified based on the workload of the Regional Security Office. Should there be an unjustified excess of positions, those excess positions could be moved to other embassies or consulates in need. Having a baseline staffing level would ensure Regional Security Offices are staffed commensurate with their embassy or consulate's threat level and size. The staffing survey should be conducted periodically to ensure no embassy or consulate remains staffed above or below its appropriate level.

The second recommendation concerns the staffing of the strategic planning unit mentioned by Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Boswell in his December 2009 statement to the Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia. In his statement, Assistant Secretary Boswell stated, “we will begin working toward the development of a strategic planning unit charged with ensuring DS is even better positioned to support future foreign policy initiatives and manage global security threats and incidents” (U.S. Senate 2009, 40). Members of this proposed planning staff should include DS special agents that have graduated from one of the U.S. military’s staff colleges and be familiar with the JOPP. The inclusion of JOPP trained special agents ensures the training and experiences of special agents are included on the planning staff. Additionally, the planning staff should be led by a General Service (GS) employee well versed in the JOPP. Having a team familiar with JOPP would ensure DS operations are planned in accordance with the method used by the U.S. military, which is especially important as the Department of State and military will continue to work together. Further, JOPP is a proven planning system and would allow DS to use a proven system as opposed to creating a new one.

The third recommendation is to increase the amount of counterterrorism and threat recognition training provided to U.S. government employees assigned overseas. Currently, there are two levels of training. One is for all civilian government personnel prior to their first overseas assignment, regardless of the location of that assignment. This mandatory training comes in two varieties, the Security Overseas Seminar (SOS) for Department of State and non-State foreign affairs personnel and the Serving Abroad for

Families and Employees (SAFE) an alternative for non-State foreign affairs personnel. The SOS program is two days and the SAFE training includes the SOS program, plus an additional program on how an embassy functions. Every five years, all foreign affairs personnel must take an online refresher security course, the Advanced Security Overseas Seminar (ASOS).

The second level of security training is the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) course. FACT is mandatory training for all U.S. government employees serving under Chief of Mission authority in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sudan. On November 1, 2010, this requirement was extended to employees going to six Mexican border cities (Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Monterrey, Nogales, Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana). FACT is also mandatory for all personnel who will be on temporary duty (TDY) status for more than 30 days in one calendar year and under Chief of Mission authority to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, and the previously mentioned six Mexican border cities. Also, all TDY personnel who will remain in Sudan for more than 60 days in one calendar year are required to take FACT. Currently, FACT is only recommended to Department of State and other government employees transferring to critical and high-threat posts (Diplomatic Security Training Center 2011a).

FACT, or a modified version, should be mandatory training for all Department of State and other government employees transferring to critical and high-threat posts and encouraged for all State employees working overseas. While this will increase the requirement for trainers, it is imperative that U.S. government employees and their families be provided with the best possible counterterrorism training before they are sent to critical or high threat posts. This additional training will assist DS in protecting these

individuals in an increasing complex security environment. Further, the additional training also benefits the Department of State by developing a better security aware and emergency trained employee base at all embassies. This additional training is even more important in the less secured embassies as the threats previously mentioned are of a global nature.

The fourth recommendation is to adjust DS special agent training. The adjustment should reflect the growing demand for DS special agents in non-permissive environments, expanding leadership roles placed on DS special agents, and the increasing publicity of DS security operations. There are currently three significant training periods in a special agent's career. First, is the initial basic special agent course (BSAC). The next training milestone is the Regional Security Officer course (BRSO). Last is the high-threat training course (HTTC). There are many other specialty and weapons specific training courses that are not germane to this recommendation.

BSAC is the initial entry level training for special agents. It covers many topics to include: DS and Department of State orientation; federal criminal law; firearms; defensive and room entry tactics; counterterrorist driving; computer search and seizure; passport and visa fraud investigations; explosive countermeasures; weapons of mass destruction; safe haven emergency medical training; and protective security operations (Diplomatic Security Training Center 2011a). The training is approximately 33 weeks long.

BRSO is training provided to special agents before they are assigned to a position within an Regional Security Office. This training consists of: Regional Security Office orientation and programs; security assets; investigations; procedural security; security

office and program management; physical, technical, and residential security; counterterrorism; crisis management; Marine security guards; local guard programs; surveillance detection program management; weapons of mass destruction response programs; how to conduct briefings; and post-blast investigations (Diplomatic Security Training Center 2011b). This training is approximately 13 weeks long.

HTTC is designed to familiarize DS special agents with advanced and specialized training in weapons, tactics, and equipment needed to operate in non-permissive environments. The curriculum is extremely demanding both mentally and physically and requires agents to be in excellent health and physical conditioning (Diplomatic Security Training Center 2011c). This training is five weeks long.

Although a DS special agent will receive almost a year of training before being assigned to a non-permissive environment, none of the training deals specifically with leadership or media awareness. There are mandatory Department of State leadership courses, but this training is based on pay grade and focuses more on office managerial situations. DS should incorporate leadership and media awareness training into the BSAC and BRSO courses. The leadership training should be similar to the leadership training provided in the U.S. Army Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Course. The ILE leadership training uses both civilian and military leadership case studies to teach leadership principles.

Further, media awareness training should also be included in BSAC and BRSO. The Department of State already conducts media awareness training at its Foreign Service Institute. Once again, the example is the media awareness training conducted during the ILE course. This ILE media awareness training includes real and mock

interviews by journalists and mandatory media/public engagements, such as public speaking and submission of an article for print in a professional journal.

The addition of these two training topics would enhance the effectiveness of DS special agents by providing them with a basic understanding of leadership principles and media awareness. Both leadership and media awareness are increasingly important factors in DS operations in non-permissive environments.

The final recommendation is for DS headquarters to emphasize a more proactive and aggressive security posture at American embassies and consulates. This may require high level engagement between DS leadership and leadership within the Department of State and between U.S. and host country officials. Examples of a proactive security posture could include simple tactics, such as high visibility embassy guard or host country police or military patrols of the embassy neighborhood, or embassy guards or host country police being preemptive in their questioning of suspicious people near embassy or consulate grounds. More complicated issues would be the use of Regional Security Office counter-surveillance teams in more countries, increased overt presence of host country police or military, allowing embassy or consulate guards to be armed, and increased physical security measures, such as random road closings or checkpoints near embassy or consulate grounds.

While some of these tactics may be negotiable between the RSO and host country officials, others may need the Ambassador and DS or Department of State officials to negotiate for their approval. Regardless, DS headquarters should emphasize the need for RSOs to be more proactive and aggressive within limits established by the host country and Ambassador. To facilitate this recommendation, DS should publish a periodic

professional journal describing tactics used by RSOs to defend their respective embassies or consulates.

These recommendations were made within the limitations established at the beginning of this chapter: available funding, American and host nation political sensitivities, and positive or neutral public affairs image. Many other recommendations were possible, but recommendations that were effective and relatively easy to implement were offered. These recommendations work with or supplement the DS security operations themes and should assist DS in confronting the challenges as outlined in the *QDDR*.

Recommendations for Further Study

There are many topics relating to DS that could be researched, ranging from the effectiveness of the passport and visa fraud criminal programs, to the use of contractors to perform DS functions. However, relating to the topic of this thesis, the area primary I recommend for further study is the use of alternative physical security measures in embassy and consulate security programs.

As mentioned previously, there are certain security standards, based on threat rating, that each embassy or consulate must meet. These standards usually preclude new embassies or consulates from being built in urban environments and require new construction to be placed in suburbs. A waiver system does exist, but the waivers are approved through DS headquarters and the Department of State. Further, some waivers must be approved by the Secretary of State.

The research on this topic could focus on what new materials or building methods may be able to provide the same level of safety, while lowering the footprint of the

embassy or consulate. The research could be in conjunction with the DS research and development office within the Countermeasures Branch. While there may be no suitable alternative, a research project may provide a definitive answer.

APPENDIX A

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS - 2009

Western Hemisphere

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Chile	2
Colombia	1
Haiti	3
Honduras	4
Nicaragua	2

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	6
American Government	6

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Attempted Bombing	1
Fake Bombing	1
Attempted Grenade	1
Bomb	3
Violent Demonstration	6

Europe

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Belgium	1
Cyprus	1
Greece	4
Norway	5
Turkey	2

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	10
American Government	3

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Attempted Bombing	1
Attempted Car Bomb	1
Bombing	2
Violent Demonstration	8
Harassment	1

Sub-Saharan Africa

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Mauritania	1
Kenya	1
Somalia	2
Zimbabwe	1

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	1
American Government	1
American NGO	2
Other	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Assassination	1
Suicide Car Bomb	2
Harassment	1
Kidnapping	1

Near East

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Egypt	1
Iraq	48
Yemen	1

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Government	49
American Tourist	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Bomb	3
Grenade	1
Rocket	41
Stabbing	1
Straffing	3
Suicide Car Bomb	1

South and Central Asia

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Afghanistan	2
Pakistan	1

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Government	2
American NGO	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Kidnapping	1
Small Arms Fire	1
Suicide Bomber	1

East Asia and the Pacific

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Indonesia	5
Japan	1

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	4
American Government	1
American NGO	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Physical Assault	1
Bomb	2
Strafing	3

United States

Target of Anti-American Incident

Business	1
----------	---

Type of Anti-American Incident

Attempted Bombing	1
-------------------	---

Source: Data adapted from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis. *2009 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 7-44.

APPENDIX B

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS - 2008

Western Hemisphere

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Bolivia	1
Colombia	2
Haiti	1
Mexico	1

Targets of Anti-American Incidents

American Government	3
American Business	1
Private American Citizen	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Extortion	1
Hostage Rescue	1
Strafing	1
Violent Demonstration	2

Europe

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Bosnia	1
Czech Republic	1
Greece	1
Serbia	2
Turkey	1

Targets of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	1
American Government	5

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Armed Attack	1
Bomb	1
Violent Demonstration	4

Sub-Saharan Africa

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Chad	1
Ethiopia	1
Nigeria	1
Sudan	1
Zimbabwe	1

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	1
American Government	2
American Missionary	1
Private American Citizen	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Assassination	1
Bombing	1
Harassment	1
Kidnapping	1
Hostage Release	1

Near East

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Iraq	9
Lebanon	2
Yemen	5

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Government	13
American Military	1
Other	1
Private American Citizen	1

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Armed Assault	1
Attempted Bombing	1
Bomb	5
Mortar	2
Kidnapping	1
Rocket Attack	4
Strafing	1
Violent Demonstration	1

South and Central Asia

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Afghanistan	5
India	1
Pakistan	5

Target of Anti-American Incidents

American Business	3
American Government	2
American NGOs	3
Other	2

Types of Anti-American Incidents

Ambush	1
Assassination	1
Armed Assault	4
Bomb	4
Kidnapping	1

East Asia and Pacific

Countries with Anti-American Incidents

Japan	1
-------	---

Target of Anti-American Incident

American Government	1
---------------------	---

Type of Anti-American Incident

Molotov Cocktail	1
------------------	---

Source: Data adapted from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Directorate of Threat Intelligence and Analysis. *2008 Political Violence Against Americans* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 3-45.

REFERENCE LIST

- Asad, Ali Hazrat Bacha and Haleem. 2010. *Dawn.com*. April 6. <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/metropolitan/03-blast-in-saddar-area-of-preshwar-ss-03> (accessed September 15, 2010).
- Bajoria, Jayshree. 2010. *Council on foreign relations*. May 6. http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F13611%2Fjayshree_bajoria%3Fgroupby%3D1%26hide%3D1%26id%3D13611%26filter%3D456#p3 (accessed September 15, 2010).
- Berglund, Nina. 2010. *Views and news from Norway*. November 4. <http://www.newsenglish.no/2010/11/04/officials-howling-over-us-embassy-secret-surveillance-in-norway/> (accessed March 9, 2011).
- Bowden, Mark. 2006. *Guests of the Ayatollah*. New York City, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 2009. *2009 political violence against Americans*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
- . 2010a. *2009 year in review*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State,.
- . 2010b. *U.S. Consulate Peshawar attack, April 5, 2010*. Rosslyn, VA: Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2010.
- Cable News Network. 2002. Hunt for Pakisstan church bombers. March 17. http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-17/world/pakistan.church_1_kristen-wormsley-nasir-khan-durrani-grenade-attack?_s=PM:asiapcf (accessed February 17, 2011).
- Casey, Kevin. 2010. On the ground In Haiti: DS keeps embassy Port-Au-Prince open For Haiti relief efforts. *DS Update*. (March 10), 1-26.
- Coll, Steve. 2004. *Ghost wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2004.
- Dambroski, Stanley. 2010. Copenhagen's regional security office rises to challenges at UN climate conference. *DS Update*. (January 13), 1-2.
- Diplomatic Security Training Center. 2011a. *Diplomatic Security Training Center*. <http://fsi.state.gov/admin/dstc/default.asp?EventID=DT102> (accessed February 28, 2011).
- . 2011b. *Diplomatic Security Training Center*. <http://fsi.state.gov/admin/dstc/default.asp?EventID=OT101> (accessed March 9, 2011).

- . 2011c. *Diplomatic Security Training Center*. <http://fsi.state.gov/admin/dstc/default.asp?EventID=HT301> (accessed March 9, 2011).
- Farrar, Jennifer. 2007. List of attacks on US Embassies. *USA Today*. May 19, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-05-19-1694610372_x.htm (accessed September 15, 2010).
- Global Security.org. 2010. Peshawar contonment. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/cantt-peshawar.htm> (accessed September 24, 2010).
- Jenkins, Brian M. 1981. *Embassies under siege: A review of 48 embassy takeovers, 1971-1980*. Research Report, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Matthews, Matt M. 2007. *We were caught unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*. Occasional Paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Nakamura, Kennon H., and Susan B.Epstein. 2007. *Diplomacy for the 21st century: transformational diplomacy*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- New America Foundation. 2010. Steve Coll. www.newamerica.net/people/steve_coll (accessed November 29, 2010).
- Overseas Security Advisory Council.2010. Website. www.osac.gov (accessed October 24, 2010).
- . 2011. About us. <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/AboutUs.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2011).
- Shah, Saeed. 2008. US diplomat targeted in Pakistan militant attack. *The Guardian*. August 27. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/27/pakistan.usa> (accessed September 25, 2010).
- U.S. Congress. 2010. *U.S. Code Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2709*. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/422/usc_sec_22_00002709----000-.html (accessed April 15, 2011).
- U.S. Department of State. 2011a. *Antiterrorism assistance program*. <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm> (accessed February 22, 2011).
- . 2011b. *Intelligence and threat analysis*. <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8584.htm> (accessed February 20, 2011).
- . 2011c. *Mobile tactical support teams*. <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8652.htm> (accessed February 26, 2011).
- . 2011d. *Quadrennial diplomacy and development review*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

- . 2011e. *Rewards for justice*. <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm> (accessed February 26, 2011).
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2005. *Overseas security: State Department has not fully implemented key measures to protect U.S. officials from terrorist attacks outside of embassies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office.
- . 2009. *State Department: Diplomatic security's recent growth warrants strategic review*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office.
- U.S. President. 1994. Presidential decision directive/NSC-29, September 16. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/pdd29.html> (accessed April 15, 2011).
- U.S. Senate. 2009. *The diplomat's shield: Diplomatic security in today's world*. Senate Hearing Transcript. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Vanity Fair. 2010. Mark Bowden. November 29. www.vanityfair.com/contributors/mark-bowden (accessed November 29, 2010).
- Wright, Robin. 2004. State's security bureau takes on expanded role. *Washington Post*, September 7: A21.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Jonathan M. Williams
Center for Army Tactics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

John A. Dyson
Department of Joint Interagency and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Gregory S. Hospodor
Department of Military History
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

U.S. Department of State
DS/PA
SA-20 Annex, 21st Floor
Washington, DC 20522-2008